


Chapter 14: Protection





Chapter 14: Protection

- Goals of Protection
- Principles of Protection
- Domain of Protection
- Access Matrix





Objectives

- Discuss the goals and principles of protection in a modern computer system
- Explain how protection domains combined with an access matrix are used to specify the resources a process may access





Goals of Protection

- In one protection model, computer consists of a collection of objects,
 - **hardware objects** (e.g., CPU, memory segments, printers, disks, and tape drives)
 - **software objects** (e.g., files, programs, and semaphores).
- Each object has a unique name and can be accessed through a well-defined set of operations
- Protection problem - ensure that each object is accessed correctly and only by those processes that are allowed to do so
- The role of protection in a computer system is to provide a mechanism for the enforcement of the policies governing resource use

Note that ***mechanisms*** and ***policies are different***.

- Mechanisms determine ***how*** something will be done.
- Policies decide ***what*** will be done.





Principles of Protection

- Guiding principle – **principle of least privilege**
 - Programs, users and systems should be given just enough **privileges** to perform their tasks
 - Limits damage if entity has a bug, gets abused/lost
 - Managing users with the **principle of least privilege** entails creating a separate account for each user, with just the privileges that the user needs.
 - “**Need-to-know principle**” a similar concept regarding access to data (at any time, a process should be able to access only those resources that it currently requires to complete its task)





Principles of Protection (Cont.)


- Must consider “grain” aspect
 - Rough-grained privilege management easier, simpler, but least privilege now done in large chunks
 - ▶ For example, traditional Unix processes either have abilities of the associated user, or of root
 - Fine-grained management more complex, more overhead, but more protective (It provides mechanisms to enable privileges when they are needed and to disable them when they are not needed).
 - ▶ File ACL lists, RBAC
- Domain can be user, process, procedure





Domain Structure

- A **protection domain** specifies the resources that the process may access.
- Each **domain** defines a set of objects and the types of operations that may be invoked on each object.
- The ability to execute an operation on an object is an **access right**.
- **Access-right** = $\langle \text{object-name}, \text{rights-set} \rangle$
where *rights-set* is a subset of all valid operations that can be performed on the object
- **Domain** = set of **access-rights**



For example, if domain D has the access right $\langle \text{file } F, \{\text{read}, \text{write}\} \rangle$, then a process executing in domain D can both read and write file F .





Domain Structure

- The association between a process and a domain may be either
 - **Static:** the set of resources available to the process is fixed throughout the process's lifetime
 - **Dynamic:** changed by process as needed – **domain switching** (enabling the process to switch from one domain to another), **privilege escalation**

- A domain can be realized in a variety of ways:
 - Each ***user*** may be a domain
 - Each ***process*** may be a domain
 - Each ***procedure*** may be a domain





Domain Implementation (UNIX)

- Domain = user-id
- Domain switch accomplished via file system
 - ▶ Each file has associated with it a domain bit (*setuid bit*)
 - ▶ When file is executed and `setuid = on`, then user-id is set to owner of the file being executed
 - ▶ When execution completes user-id is reset
- Domain switch accomplished via passwords
 - `su` command temporarily switches to another user's domain when other domain's password provided
- Domain switching via commands
 - `sudo` command prefix executes specified command in another domain (if original domain has privilege or password given)





Access Matrix

- Protection model can be viewed as a matrix → **access matrix**
 - Rows: represent domains
 - Columns: represent objects
 - Entry: **Access**(i, j) is the set of operations that a process executing in Domain $_i$ can invoke on Object $_j$

domain \ object	F_1	F_2	F_3	printer
D_1	read		read	
D_2				print
D_3		read	execute	
D_4	read write		read write	





Use of Access Matrix

- If a process in Domain D_i tries to do “op” on object O_j , then “op” must be in the access matrix
- The access matrix provides a mechanism for defining and implementing strict control for both static and dynamic association between processes and domains.
- When we switch a process from one domain to another, we are executing an operation (*switch*) on an object (the *domain*).





Access Matrix of with Domains as Objects

domain \ object	F_1	F_2	F_3	laser printer	D_1	D_2	D_3	D_4
D_1	read		read			switch		
D_2				print			switch	switch
D_3		read	execute					
D_4	read write		read write		switch			





Use of Access Matrix

- User who creates object can define access column for that object
- Can be expanded to dynamic protection (Allowing controlled change in the contents of the access-matrix entries)
 - Operations to add, delete access rights
 - Special access rights:
 - ▶ *owner of O_i*
 - ▶ *copy op from O_i to O_j* (denoted by asterisk “*” appended to the access right)
 - ▶ *control* – D_j can modify D_j access rights
 - *Copy* and *Owner* applicable to an object
 - *Control* applicable only to domain objects





Access Matrix with Copy Rights

The copy right allows the access right to be copied only within the column (for the object) for which the right is defined.

domain \ object	F_1	F_2	F_3
D_1	execute		write*
D_2	execute	read*	execute
D_3	execute		

(a)

domain \ object	F_1	F_2	F_3
D_1	execute		write*
D_2	execute	read*	execute
D_3	execute	read	

(b)





Access Matrix With Owner Rights

We also need a mechanism to allow addition of new rights and removal of some rights. The owner right controls these operation

- If $\text{access}(i, j)$ includes the *owner* right, then a process executing in domain D_i can add and remove any right in any entry in column j

domain \ object	F_1	F_2	F_3
D_1	owner execute		write
D_2		read* owner	read* owner write
D_3	execute		

(a)

domain \ object	F_1	F_2	F_3
D_1	owner execute		write
D_2		owner read* write*	read* owner write
D_3		write	write

(b)





Modified Access Matrix with *control* Right

If access(i, j) includes the *control* right, then a process executing in domain D_i can add or remove any access right from row j .

control right in access (D_2, D_4).
 → a process executing in domain D_2 could modify domain D_4

object \ domain	F_1	F_2	F_3	laser printer	D_1	D_2	D_3	D_4
D_1	read		read			switch		
D_2				print			switch	switch
D_3		read	execute					
D_4	read write		read write		switch			

object \ domain	F_1	F_2	F_3	laser printer	D_1	D_2	D_3	D_4
D_1	read		read			switch		
D_2				print			switch	switch control
D_3		read	execute					
D_4	write		write		switch			



Use of Access Matrix (Cont.)

- **Access matrix** design separates mechanism from policy
 - Mechanism
 - ▶ Operating system provides access-matrix + rules
 - ▶ It ensures that the matrix is only manipulated by authorized agents and that rules are strictly enforced
 - Policy
 - ▶ User dictates policy
 - ▶ Who can access what object and in what mode
- However, it does not solve the general **confinement problem**
- The problem of guaranteeing that no information initially held in an object can migrate outside of its execution environment is called the **confinement problem**.



End of Chapter 14

